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The conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes at an additional cost 
on firms imposed by the government, which may erode their global competitiveness. However, 
during the last decade, this paradigm has been challenged by a number of analysts. In 
particular, Porter (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) argues that pollution is often 
associated with a waste of resources (material, energy, etc.), and that more stringent 
environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may compensate for the costs of 
complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter hypothesis. In fact, there are many 
ways through which improving the environmental performance of a company can lead to a 
better economic or financial performance, and not necessarily to an increase in cost. To be 
systematic, it is important to look at both sides of the balance sheet. 
 
First, a better environmental performance can lead to an increase in revenues through the 
following channels: i)  a better access to certain markets; ii)  the possibility to differentiate 
products and iii)  the possibility to sell pollution-control technology. Second, a better 
environmental performance can lead to cost reductions in the following categories: iv) regulatory 
cost; v)  cost of material, energy and services (this refers mainly to the Porter hypothesis); 
vi) cost of capital, and vii) cost of labour. 
 
Although these different possibilities have been identified from a conceptual or theoretical point 
of view for some time (Reinhardt, 2000; Lankoski, 2000, 2006), to our knowledge, there was no 
systematic effort to provide empirical evidences supporting the existence of these opportunities 
and assessing their “magnitude”. This is the objective of this paper. For each of the seven 
possibilities identified above [i) through vii)], we present the mechanisms involved, a systematic 
view of the empirical evidence available, and a discussion of the gaps in the empirical literature.   
The objective of the paper is not to show that a reduction of pollution is always accompanied by 
a better financial performance, it is rather to argue that the expenses incurred to reduce 
pollution can sometime be partly or completely compensated by gains made elsewhere. 
Through a systematic examination of all the possibilities, we also want to identify the 






Managers have long associated environmental protection with additional costs imposed by the 
government, which may erode the global competitiveness. This view relies on a basic paradigm 
which can be described as follows. In general, markets work well to reach an optimal use of 
scarce resources, so that government intervention is only useful to redistribute revenues, or 
when markets are no longer fulfilling their role effectively. This is precisely what occurs in the 
case of environmental problems. One of the prerequisites for the adequate functioning of 
markets is the existence of well-defined ownership rights. Evidently, in the case of 
environmental resources such as air or water, these rights are very difficult to assign. Therefore, 
because air and water belong to no one (or to anyone), economic agents may use them at zero 
cost, whereas the actual cost of this use for the society as a whole is certainly greater. Polluters 
receive the wrong signal and, because they use these resources without paying the true price, 
they are encouraged to do so to excess. Left alone, the market generates too much pollution 
compared with the desirable or optimal level. Government intervention is then legitimate in order 
2 to control pollution and reduce it to a tolerable threshold. To this effect, the government has at 
its disposal panoply of instruments such as regulation, taxation or pollution permits
1, which may 
result in the polluters receiving the right signal, once confronted with the true cost of their 
actions. In short, from this perspective, consideration of the environment is necessarily 
associated with a cost increase for companies that have used environmental resources with 
impunity. 
 
However, during the last decade, this paradigm has been challenged by a number of analysts 
(Walley and Whitehead, 1994; Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995).  In particular, 
Porter argues that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources (material, energy, 
etc.), and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may 
compensate for the costs of complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter 
hypothesis. In fact, there are many ways through which improving the environmental 
performance of a company can lead to a better economic or financial performance
2, and not 
necessarily to an increase in cost. To be systematic, it is important to look at both sides of the 
balance sheet. 
 
First, a better environmental performance can lead to an increase in revenues through the 
following channels: i)  a better access to certain markets; ii)  the possibility to differentiate 
products and iii)  the possibility to sell pollution-control technology. Second, a better 
environmental performance can lead to cost reductions in the following categories: iv) regulatory 
cost; v)  cost of material, energy and services (this refers mainly to the Porter hypothesis); 
vi) cost of capital, and vii) cost of labour. These possibilities are summarized in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
POSITIVE LINKS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Possibilities to Increase Revenues  Possibilities to Reduce Cost 
i)  Better Access to Certain Markets 
ii) Possibility  to  Differentiate  Products 
iii)  Selling Pollution-Control Technologies 
iv) Regulatory  Cost 
v)  Cost of Material, Energy and Services 
vi)  Cost of Capital 
vii)  Cost of Labour 
Source: Lankoski (2006) adapted by the authors. 
 
Although these different possibilities have been identified from a conceptual or theoretical point 
of view for some time (Reinhardt, 2000; Lankoski, 2000, 2006), to our knowledge, there was no 
systematic effort to provide empirical evidences supporting the existence of these opportunities 
and to assess their “magnitude”. This is the objective of this paper. For each of the seven 
possibilities identified above [i) through vii)], we present the mechanisms involved, a systematic 
                                                 
1 In general, it is considered that “market-based” instruments, like green taxes and pollution permits 
should be preferred over regulation, because they provide incentives for abatement cost minimization and 
for continuous innovation. 
2 As described by Schaltegger and Wagner (2006), “the environmental performance of a company can be 
defined by means of its physical performance with regard to environmental aspects based on 
environmental performance indicators (EPI). Such EPIs can describe mass, energy or pollutant flows 
through the manufacturing process (e.g. the use of energy or water resources, or the emissions of 
pollutants from processes or products)” (p.12). The economic or financial performance refers to common 
measures of profitability like “returns on assets” (ROA), “returns on equity” (ROE), or returns on sales 
(ROS). 
3 view of the empirical evidence available, and a discussion of the gaps in the empirical literature.  
Furthermore, in each of the seven cases, we try to identify the circumstances most likely to lead 
to a “win-win” situation (i.e., better environmental and financial performance)
3, and a diagnostic 
on the types of firms most likely to enjoy such benefits.  The objective of the paper is not to 
show that a reduction of pollution is always accompanied by a better financial performance, it is 
rather to show that, in many cases, the expenses incurred to reduce pollution can be partly or 
completely compensated by gains made elsewhere.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the possibilities available to 
improve the environmental performance of a company, while increasing its revenues [i) to iii)]. 
Section III shows how a pollution reduction can lead a cost reduction; as mentioned above, we 
consider four categories of cost: iv) regulatory cost; v) cost of material, energy and services; vi) 
cost of capital and vii) cost of labour. Through the items v) and vi), we will be led to survey two 
broad and controversial areas in the economics literature: the one related to the Porter 
hypothesis and the literature on the reaction of capital markets to environmental information. 
Section IV provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
II.  A better environmental performance may mean more revenues 
 
i) Better access to certain markets 
 
A better environmental performance may facilitate the access to certain markets. First, generally 
speaking, reducing pollution and other environmental impacts may improve the overall image or 
prestige of a company, and thus increase customers loyalty or support sales efforts. Although, 
this argument seems pretty straightforward, it is difficult to find strong empirical evidence that 
customers are influenced by the “green” image of a company. Consumers may be aware of the 
environmental performance of a company through its offer of green products, but they are less 
likely to know its environmental performance measured through its emissions in water, in the 
atmosphere
4, etc.  
 
Second, more specifically, it is useful to scrutinize the purchasing policies of public and private 
organizations. First, it is becoming more and more common for public administration to include 
the environmental performance (or performance with respect to sustainable development) as a 
criterion to choose suppliers of goods or services. This phenomenon is known as green public 
purchasing (GPP). As an illustration, Kunzik (2003) reports that, in general, the central U.K. 
government, in its policy Greening of Government Operations, aims at (p. 194): 
 
 (….) 
  Encouraging manufacturers, suppliers and contractors through specifications to 
develop environmentally preferable goods and services at competitive prices; 
                                                 
3 Some authors extend that notion to “win-win-win” strategies in cases where consumers also enjoy a 
benefit (e.g., Elkington, 1994). 
4 Green consumerism is a frequently cited motivation for corporate environmental actions. However, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of green consumerism is mitigated. For instance, Arora and Carson 
(1996) find that firms operating in industries with higher advertising to sales ratios were more likely to join 
voluntary environmental programs launched by the EPA, while Konar and Cohen (1997) find the contrary. 
Furthermore, Khanna and Damon (1998) find, within the chemical industry, that final good producers 
were also more likely to join voluntary programs than were producers of intermediate goods. For more 
discussion, see Lyon and Maxwell (1999). 
4   Ensuring that any products derived from wildlife such as timber, plants and leather 
goods are from sustainable sources… 
 
More specifically, for instance, the U.K. Department of Environment, Transport and Regions has 
the following objectives (p. 197): 
 
 (…) 
  Buying a minimum of 10% of electricity from renewable sources; 
  Purchasing sustainably produced timber products by, for example, specifying that 
suppliers provide independently verifiable documentary evidence that their timber 
has been lawfully obtained from sustainable forests managed “to prevent harm to 
other ecosystems and any indigenous people.” 
 
In the U.S., the Federal Acquisition Regulations provide a detailed code of rules governing 
procurement by all Federal agencies. For instance, these rules imply that “the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has to prepare guidelines on the availability, sources, and potential 
uses of recovered materials and associated products, including solid waste management 
services; and require federal agencies themselves to develop and implement affirmative 
procurement programs for EPA-designated products within a year after the EPA’s designation” 
(Kunzik, 2003, p. 203). 
 
Overall, public purchasing is fairly important in the economy. In 1998, it was estimated that 
government sector expenditures for consumption and investment was responsible for 20% of 
GDP in OECD Member countries, 9% when subtracting compensation for employees 
(Johnstone and Erdlenbruch, 2003). It can be argued that green public purchasing “can spur 
innovation by increasing the competitive advantage of “greener” products in the market which 
can then be followed by larger commercialisation and diffusion. In particular, public demand 
may provide “demonstration” effects, giving valuable information to other actors in the economy 
about potential benefits of newer untried green technologies and products” (p. 12). 
 
The magnitude of GPP is difficult to assess, but it seems clearly present. In particular, in May 
2001, the OECD Environment Ministers have adopted the Environmental Strategy for the First 
Decade of the 21
st Century, in which there is a recommendation “to improve the environmental 
performance of public procurement practices” (Johnstone and Erdlenbruch, 2003). 
 
We also have examples of private companies which have taken steps for the “greening of their 
supply chain”. Presumably, all plants with the ISO 14001 certification pay attention to the 
environmental performance of their suppliers since this is one of the criteria to be fulfilled to 
obtain the certification (Barla, 2005; Hess et al., 1999)
5. Furthermore, a recent survey of the 
OECD, covering more than 4000 facilities in seven countries, shows that 43 % of them assess 
the environmental performance of their suppliers (Johnstone et al., 2007).   
 
Some companies’policies regarding the green performance of their supplier have been well 
documented in certain case studies. For instance, before choosing a supplier, IBM asks the 
potential candidates to do a self-evaluation of their environmental performance and, for those 
who have a satisfying score at the self-evaluation test, there is an on-site visit for a thorough 
evaluation (Herren et al., 1998). In the same vein, since 1992, Body Shop International has a 
strict evaluation system for the environmental performance of its suppliers, the “Supplier 
                                                 
5 On January 1
st, 2006, there were 103  583 plants worldwide that were certified ISO 14001, see 
http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htm. 
5 environmental star-rating scheme” (Wycherley, 1999). As shown in Reichert and Larson (1998), 
IKEA is also known for its strict requirements for suppliers regarding harmful chemicals (such as 
formaldehyde), wood sourcing (such as rainforest woods) and packaging materials (which have 
to be recyclable or reusable and use no PVCs). 
 
Is it worthwhile for firms to incur extra expenses to improve their environmental performance in 
order to have a better access to certain markets?  There is little evidence about that.  At best, 
we can rely on the recent study of Hamschmidt and Dyllick (2006) who provide, to our 
knowledge, the first cost-benefit analysis of the implementation by an enterprise of ISO 14001. 
Arguably, in many cases, companies are making the effort of complying with the ISO14000 
requirements in order to improve their image, and to reach extra customers (Hess et al., 1999).  
For their sample of 158 certified Swiss firms, they find that the average payback period of the 
adoption of ISO 14000 was 2.2 years.  More empirical studies of that type would be 
appreciated. 
 
It seems that most firms can actually obtain a better access to certain markets via an 
improvement of their environmental performance. However, at this stage, the companies 
most likely to make these gains are those selling their products or services to public 
authorities. According to Marron (2003), the most important private suppliers of public 
administration are in the following sectors: construction, energy services, transport 
equipments, transport services, shipbuilding, medical equipment, army equipment 
(including paper), office equipment, electrical machinery and wearing apparel. 
 
ii) A possibility to differentiate products 
 
In the same line as the preceding discussion, it is also possible that a better environmental 
performance through greener products or services can allow companies to use a differentiation 
strategy so as to exploit niches in environmentally conscious market segments. In this case, 
even if green products or services are more expensive to produce, the extra cost can likely be 




Eco-labelling can make the information about the environmental features of the product or 
service more credible or attractive. The popularity of ecolabelling is increasing, especially in 
Europe. In particular, the sales of the products with the European eco-label went from 
51 million Є in 2000 to 644 millions in 2004
7. The willingness to buy green products is also 
important. For example, 80% of the French adults say that they are ready to favour the 
purchase of ecoproducts, 10% say that they do it regularly (Guilloux, 2006). 
 
                                                 
6 In the economic literature, a better environmental performance is considered as a vertical attribute of a 
product, similar to high quality (Cremer and Thisse, 1999, Bansal and S. Gangopadhyay, 2003). It relies 
on the assumption that environmentally aware consumers are willing to pay more for cleaner products. As 
a result, a market powered firm might find it profitable to offer a green version of its product at a higher 
price or to specialize in green products. Yet environmental performance might be difficult to asses by 
consumers. When this performance is firm’s private information, it can be signalled through a higher price 
if less polluting products are also more costly to produce (Mahenc, 2007). Moreover, asymmetric 
information on product greenest might lead to a lemon-type market failure à la Akerlof (1970) which can 
be reduced through eco-labelling to the benefit of the producing firms (Ambec and Barla, 2005). 
 
7 http://160.92.130.69/ecolabels/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=2. 
6 Specific examples of enterprises which have adopted this differentiation strategy are numerous. 
Among the classical ones, there is Patagonia, an American sport garments company, which, in 
the 1990s, has launched new lines of clothes made in recycled PET (polyethylene terephtalate), 
or organic cotton. This was a commercial success in spite of the higher price of these products 
(Reinhardt, 2000). Toyota is also adopting this strategy; it has officially that in 2012, all its 
models would be equipped with hybrid engines. Already, one can see the success of its first 
hybrid model, the Prius. For instance, the sales of this model have increased by 139% in the 
U.S. from 2004 to 2005
8. 
 
The Swiss chemical company Ciba Geigy has created, in the mid 90s, a new type of bioreactive 
dyes, CIBACRON LS. This new dye had a higher fixation rate, which meant that less dye was 
required to colour textiles. In turn, this meant that rinsing was simpler and less expensive, and 
that firms’ wastewater treatment costs could be lower. In other words, this dye helped Ciba’s 
clients to reduce their environmental cost. Ciba has protected this new dye via a patent. The 
dye was a commercial success in spite of a higher price (Reinhardt, 1999). 
 
The development of the “bio” food industry serves as another example of the success of this 
strategy, although in this case, one can argue that, when buying these products, consumers are 
also looking for their health attributes. This industry is becoming “sizable”; for instance, the 
world market for “bio” food products was estimated at 23.1 billion euros for 2004, a rise of 9% 
over 2003. This represents almost 4% of the world food market
9. In Europe, the market share 
for bio-food is estimated at 7%. Similarly, the sales of organic cotton (produced without chemical 
fertilizers or pesticides) are soaring worldwide from $245  millions in 2001 to an estimated 
$1 billion in 2006
10. 
 
It is also becoming more and more common to see companies emerging in the “green energy” 
market, i.e. companies that have access to the grid to sell energy from renewable sources like 
biomass, wind or solar. An example that is well documented is the Dutch enterprise PNEM that 
is producing electricity from a biomass-fired power plant (Hofman, 2005). Such companies can 
be successful in spite of a higher price. 
 
Here again, we can ask the question: is it worthwhile for firms to adopt this strategy?  Here gain, 
there is not much empirical evidence available.  FGCAQ (2004) and Parsons (2005) study the 
profitability of farms producing bio milk compared to that of farms producing regular milk, and 
they conclude that there is no significant difference between the two groups.  In the same vein, 
Johansson et al. (2001) report ten commercial success stories from ecodesign
11, like the French 
company Parkeon who is a world leader for the production of parking ticket machines working 
with solar energy.  Ecodesign can bring commercial benefits in different ways like reducing the 
quantity of raw material used, reducing the cost of packaging, reducing transportation cost and, 
of course, helping to reach new niches of consumers
12.  More studies of that nature are needed. 
  
From these examples, it seems that this differentiation strategy is more likely to work 
when
13 i) the information about the environmental features of the product is credible 
                                                 
8 http://news.techwhack.com/3574/hybrid-vehicles/. 
9 http://seme.cer.free.fr/index.php?cat=filiere-bio. 
10 Les Échos, November, 21st 2006. 
11 Ecodesign refers to all the actions taken and activities carried out originating from the incorporation of 
environmental performance requirements in a product development project (Johansson et al., 2001, p. 8). 
12 See also UNEP (2001) for other evidences. 
13 See also Reinhardt (2000), for more discussion. 
7 (e.g., an eco-label); ii) there is a willingness-to-pay by the consumers (it is more difficult 
with low-end products) and iii) there is a barrier to imitation from competitors (like the 
patent obtained by Ciba). The variety of the examples that were just presented allows us 
to believe that a wide range of enterprises can actually reach a better environmental 
performance and obtain more revenues by using this strategy. Even firms producing 
fairly homogenous goods usually difficult to differentiate, like agricultural products or 
energy, can do so. 
 
iii) Selling pollution-control technology 
 
Of course, for decades, solving environmental problems has become a business opportunity for 
many companies specialized in this area that we can refer to as the eco-industry. A detailed 
description of this industry and its market structure goes beyond the scope of this paper
14. We 
are rather interested by firms which, in their search for better environmental performance, are 
led to do research and development in the area of pollution-control technologies, so as to 
optimize their manufacturing or waste management processes. This can lead to technological 
breakthroughs that eventually can be attractive for others. Companies adopting such a strategy 
may also enjoy a “first-mover” advantage, and may eventually lobby governments for stricter 
regulations. 
 
For example, as mentioned above, Ciba has patented its new dye Cibacron LS that could be 
sold to other companies under licensing agreements. Actually, following its experience with the 
new dye and wastewater treatment, Ciba Geigy has bought in 1998 Allied Colloids Group, a 
British firm that manufactured water treatment additives. This was the first step in creating its 
environmental division. Another example of a large company which has diversified its activity by 
opening an “environment” division is General Electric. This division Ecomagination is made of 
32 clean-technology products like wind turbines. Ecomagination had revenues of $10 billions in 
2005 and is forecasting 20 billions in 2010
15. 
 
In the same vein, the major aluminium producer ALCAN has developed and tested a spent 
potlining (SPL)
16 treatment process, the Low Caustic Leaching and Liming (LCLL) process. Up 
to now, SPL was considered as a hazardous waste that must be stored or landfilled very 
carefully. With its new process, Alcan will be able to recycle a large part of this waste. It will 
soon build a new plant in Canada to treat its own SPL and, eventually, that from other 
companies. 
 
So far, we must say that it was difficult to find examples of companies that were able to 
benefit from such technological opportunities as a commercial by-product. This is an 
indicator that “selling pollution-control technology” as one way to turn an environmental 
problem into an increase in revenues is probably not a widespread phenomenon. The 
                                                 
14 Eco-industries: industries which produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimise or 
correct environmental damage to water, air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-
systems. This includes cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk and 
minimize resource use”. In 2005, it was estimated that the eco-industries were representing revenues of 
180 billions € and 500 000 jobs http://ec.europa.eu/research/briefings/sustain-devel_fr.html. 
15 http://ge.ecomagination.com/@v=020220071742@/site/index.html#home 
16 “Spent potlining (SPL) is the main waste residue generated by the reduction process in the smelters 
producing aluminium. It consists of the internal lining of the pots, which is replaced after five to seven 
years of use. SPL is classified as hazardous waste by many jurisdictions worldwide due to its toxicity and 
explosive nature” http://www.publications.alcan.com/sustainability/2005. 
8 three examples we found suggest that firms must already have research facilities, and a 
large amount of resources, to eventually sell a pollution-control technology that they 
have developed for themselves.  More empirical work, digging into licensing agreements 
for instance, would help to have a clearer picture of this issue.   
 
 
III.  A better environmental performance may mean lower costs 
 
iv) Regulatory cost 
 
As suggested in particular by Lankoski (2006), a better environmental performance can be 
associated with lower regulatory costs in the sense that continuous compliance means lower 
liability costs, avoiding fines and litigation. In certain areas, less pollution can also lead to a 
lower amount of environmental taxes to be paid, or a smaller quantity of tradable permits to be 
bought. In the same vein, a better environmental performance may allow a firm to anticipate 
future regulation and influence standard development. 
 
As a concrete example, El Bizat (2006) shows, through a survey of the Canadian jurisprudence, 
that the implementation of a proper environmental management system (EMS), like that 
recognized by ISO 14001, can be useful to prove due diligence in court when there are cases of 
illegal spills or other environmental accidents. 
 
Furthermore, firms may find useful to reduce their pollution, or to improve their pollution-control 
technologies, in order to enjoy a strategic first-mover advantage in case of a tightening of the 
environmental regulation.  For instance, it is well documented that, in the eighties, Dupont has 
lobbied to ban CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances, because it had the leadership in 
the research for substitutes (Reinhardt, 2000).  In such a case, one can argue that either 
regulatory costs are reduced, or that revenues are improved.   
 
The companies most likely to benefit from these costs reductions are those which are 
heavily regulated. One can include in this category firms with toxic emissions, like the 
chemical or metallurgic industries, or firms with important polluting emissions like the 
pulp and paper or the energy sector. 
 
 
v) Cost of material, energy and services
17
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Porter has suggested that pollution is generally associated 
with the waste of resources, with raw material not fully used, or with lost energy. “Pollution is a 
manifestation of economic waste and involves unnecessary or incomplete utilisation of 
resources,…Reducing pollution is often coincident with improving productivity with which 
resources are used” (Porter and van der Linde 1995: 98, 105). From this reasoning, Porter 
argues that more stringent and flexible environmental policies (like taxes and tradable permits) 
would be fruitful for the economy, stimulating innovations that may compensate for the costs of 
complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter hypothesis (PH). In particular, this 
line of reasoning implies that reducing pollution can generate a reduction of expenditures on raw 
material, energy or services.  The PH is schematically represented in Figure 1. 
                                                 

















In the economic literature, the PH has been criticized for its lack of theoretical foundation 
(Palmer et al., 1995). Profit maximizing firms should not ignore profitable investments in 
innovation, being regulated or not, in an economy with perfect markets. Recent papers have 
provided foundations to the PH by introducing a market failure (in addition to the one due to 
pollution). The environmental regulation, which is devoted to solve the market failure due to the 
pollution externality, turns out to mitigate the other market failure to the benefit of the regulated 
firms. Example of such market failures include spillovers in knowledge (Jaffe et al., 2004, 
Ambec and Barla, 2005), or in learning-by-doing (Mohr, 2002), asymmetric information within 
firms (Ambec and Barla, 2002), market power (Simpson and Bradford, 1996, Greaker, 2003), 
and specific investments with contractual incompleteness (Ambec and Barla, 2005). The other 
theoretical explanations for the PH rely on the assumption that managers do not maximize the 
firm’s future profits because she or he is risk-averse (Kennedy, 1994) or present-biased (Ambec 
and Barla, 2005). 
 
Given the objective of this paper, it is relevant to review the rapidly growing empirical literature 
on the Porter hypothesis.  We distinguish two set of studies. A first set estimates the impact of 
environmental regulations on firm’s innovation policy and technological choice measured by 
investment in R&D, in capital and new technologies, or successful patent applications. These 
studies test the first premise of the Porter Hypothesis that more stringent environmental 
regulations enhance innovation. Yet more innovation is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the PH. Therefore, they can only invalidate or provide some support to the mechanism 
underlying the PH without directly testing it. In the second set, the impact of environmental 
regulation is estimated on measures of firms’ performance such as productivity and costs. The 
aim is to test whether more stringent environmental policies can be beneficial to the firm. Yet 
those papers are silent on the process that leads to higher productivity. Table 2 below (adapted 
from Ambec and Barla, 2006) summarizes several empirical papers that fit in these two sets. 
 
10 In the first set of papers, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) estimate the relationship between total R&D 
expenditures (or the number of successful patent applications) and pollution abatement costs (a 
proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation). They found a positive link with R&D 
expenditures (an increase of 0.15% in R&D expenditures for a pollution abatement cost 
increase of 1%), but no statistically significant link with the number of patents. Restricting 
themselves to environmentally-related successful patents, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) 
found a positive but small relationship with environmental regulation. Both studies suggest a 
weak but positive link between a better environmental performance (through better compliance 
with regulation) and the firm’s innovation policy. 
 
TABLE 2 
Empirical studies on the Porter Hypothesis 
STUDY  DATA  METHODOLOGY  MAIN RESULTS 
I. Impact of Environmental Regulations (ERs) on Innovation and Technology  
Jaffe and 
Palmer (1997) 




▪ Reduced form model. 
▪  Innovation proxy: R&D 
investments and number of 
successful patent applications. 
▪ ERs proxy: Pollution control 
capital costs. 
▪ R&D significantly increases 
with ERs. Elasticity: +0.15. 
▪  No significant impact of 









▪ Reduced form model. 
▪  Innovation proxy: number of 
environmentally-related 
successful patent applications. 
▪ ERs: Pollution control 
operating costs and number of 
air and water pollution control 
inspections. 
▪ Small but significant impact 
of pollution operating cost 
on number of patents. 
▪  No impact of inspections. 
Nelson et al. 
(1993) 
▪ 44 U.S. electric 
utilities over the 
1969-1983 
period. 
▪ Three-equation model: i) age 
of capital; ii) emissions; and iii) 
regulatory expenditures. 
▪  Model includes two ER 
proxies: air pollution cost and 
total pollution control costs per 
KW capacity. 
▪ ERs  significantly  increase 
age of capital (elasticity: 
+0.15). 
▪  Age of capital has no 
statistically-significant 
impact on emissions. 
▪  Regulation has impacted 
emission levels. 
Arimura et al. 
(2007) 





▪ Bivariate probit model with 
  (1) Environmental R&D dummy 
regressed on various 
measures of environmental 
policy (perceived stringency, 
standards, taxes), an 
environmental accounting 
dummy and other 
management practices control 
variables. 
 (2) Environmental accounting 
dummy regressed on same 
variables. 
▪  The perceived ER 
stringency has a positive 
and significant impact on 
the probability to a run an 
environmental R&D 
program. 
▪ The type of ER (standard 
or tax) has no significant 
effects on environmental 
R&D. 
Popp (2003)  ▪ Patent data and 
performance 
measures of flue 
▪ SO2 removal efficiency of new 
scrubbers regressed on the 
flow of knowledge (measured 
▪  The new SO2 emission 
permit regulation 
introduced in 1990 





186 plants in US 
(1972-1997). 
by patents) and policy 
variables. 
▪ Operating  and  maintenance 
cost of scrubbers regressed on 
same variables. 
increased SO2 removal 
efficiency and lowered 
operating and removal 
costs. 
Popp (2006)  ▪  Patent data from 
the U.S., Japan, 
and Germany 
(1967-2001). 
▪ Impact of SO2 (US) and NOX 
(Germany and Japan) ERs on 
patenting and patent citations. 
▪ ERs: timing of the introduction 
of new ERs. 
▪ Estimate the cross-countries 
spillovers using patent citation 
origins. 
▪ ERs regulation followed by 
an increase of patenting 
from domestic firms but not 
from foreign firms. 
▪  Earlier ERs for NOX in 
Germany and Japan are 
important components of 
US patents for pollution 
control technologies to 
reduce NOx emissions. 
II. Impact of ERs on Productivity 
Gollop and 
Robert (1983) 
▪ 56 U.S. electric 
utilities, 1973-
1979. 
▪ Productivity measure: derived 
from the estimation of a cost 
function that includes the ERs 
proxy. 
▪ ERs: the intensity of SO2 
regulations based on actual 
emissions, state standard and 
the utility estimated 
unconstrained emission levels. 
▪ ERs  reduce  productivity 
growth by 43%. 
Smith and 
Sims (1983) 
▪  4 Canadian beer 
breweries, 
1971-1980. 
▪ Productivity measure: derived 
from the estimation of a cost 
function. 
▪ Two breweries were submitted 
to an effluent surcharge and 
two breweries were not. 
▪ Average  productivity 
growth regulated breweries 
-0.08% compared to +1.6% 
for the unregulated plants. 




▪ Change in average annual 
total factor productivity growth 
between 1959-69 period and 
the 1973-78 period regresses 
on pollution control operating 
costs. 
▪  30% of the decline in 
productivity growth in the 













▪ Derive the direct (abatement 
cost growth) and indirect 
(changes in other inputs and 
production process) effects of 
pollution control capital using a 
cost function approach. 
▪ Overall, abatement capital 
requirements reduce 
productivity growth by 10% 
to 30%. 









▪ Total factor productivity growth 
regressed on changes in the 
ratio of the value of investment 
in pollution-control equipment 
to total cost. 
▪  ERs have a significantly 
negative impact on 
productivity growth rate. 
Berman and ▪ US  petroleum  ▪  Comparison of total factor ▪ Stricter  regulations  imply 
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Bui (2001)  refining industry, 
1987-1995. 
productivity of California South 
Coast refineries (submitted to 
stricter air pollution 
regulations) with other US 
refineries. 
▪ ERs severity is measured by 
the number of environmental 
regulations each refinery is 
submitted to. 
higher abatement costs. 
However, these 
investments appear to 









▪ Total factor productivity growth 
regressed on lagged changes 
in the ratio of the value of 
investment in pollution-control 
equipment to total cost. 
▪  ERs have a significantly 
positive impact on 
productivity growth rate, 
especially in the sectors 










▪ Productivity measure obtained 
through the estimation of a 
profit function that includes 
pollution abatement 
expenditures (US) and 
inspection frequency (Mexico) 
as proxies for ERs. 
▪ US: negligible effect of ERs 
on both profit and 
productivity. 
▪  Mexico: ERs have a 
negative impact on profits 





▪ 116 U.S. paper 
mills, 1979-
1990. 
▪  Regression of total factor 
productivity on pollution 
abatement operating costs, 
technology and vintage 
dummies and interaction terms 
between the dummies and the 
abatement variable. 
▪ Estimation of a production 
function that includes beside 
input prices, pollution 
abatement costs and other 
control variables. 
▪ Significant  reduction  in 
productivity associated with 
abatement efforts 
particularly in integrated 
paper mills. 
 
For the firm’s technological choices, two studies emphasize a negative relationship between 
environmental regulations and investment in capital. Nelson et al. (1993) found that air pollution 
regulations significantly increased the age of capital in the U.S. electric utilities in the seventies. 
According to Gray and Shabegian (1998), more stringent air and water regulations have a 
significant impact on paper mills’ technological choice in the U.S. However, their results suggest 
that it tends to divert investment from productivity to abatement, consistently with the standard 
paradigm. 
 
The second set of studies has a long tradition in the economic literature (see Jaffe et al., 1995, 
for a review). Most papers reviewed in Jaffe et al. (1995) highlight a negative impact of 
environmental regulation on productivity. For instance, Gallop and Robert (1983) estimated that 
SO2 regulations slowed down productivity growth in the U.S.. in the seventies. by 43%. More 
recent papers (see Table 2) find more positive results. For example, Berman and Bui (2001) 
report that refineries located in the Los Angeles area enjoyed a significantly higher productivity 
that other U.S. refineries despite a more stringent air pollution regulation in this area. Similarly, 
Alpay et al. (2002) estimated the productivity of the Mexican food processing industry to be 
13 increasing with the pressure of environmental regulation. They therefore suggest that a more 
stringent regulation is not always detrimental to productivity. 
 
Although the mentioned studies tend to reject the Porter Hypothesis, one cannot conclude that 
being green harms the firm. Concerning this research, three caveats are worth to be mentioned. 
First, it may be argued that previous studies have not well taken into account the dynamic 
dimensions of the Porter hypothesis. Porter argues that more stringent environmental policies 
will lead to innovations to reduce inefficiencies and this, in turn, will eventually reduce costs. 
This process may take some time. In previous studies on the determinants of productivity, 
researchers have regressed productivity at time 0 on proxies of environmental regulation 
stringency at time 0 as well, which is not allowing time for the innovation process to occur. By 
introducing lags of three or four years between changes in the severity of environmental 
regulations and their impact on productivity, Lanoie et al. (2005) have found that more severe 
regulations is leading to modest gains in productivity in a sample of 17 Quebec manufacturing 
sectors. Furthermore, they show that this effect is more important in industries highly exposed to 
outside competition. 
 
Second, the cited papers use “traditional” productivity indexes that do not include pollution as an 
input or an output. The “green” measures of productivity include pollution as an undesirable 
output with a negative price which might corresponds to the marginal cost of getting rid of 
pollution or the marginal damage of pollution (see, for example, Fare, et al., 1989). The green 
productivity would indeed coincide with the conventional one if the firms would bear the full 
social cost of pollution in line with the polluter-pay principle. With a somehow light regulation, or 
in an unregulated industry, the gap between the two measures can be substantial. Repetto et al. 
(1997) estimated an increase of productivity by 0.36 to 0.44 percent each year instead of 0.16 
annually in the 1970s and 1980s for the electric power and pulp and paper industries, after 
including the cost of pollution in the productivity measure.  
 
Third, most studies rely on command-and-control regulatory instruments, such as pollution 
standards, while environmental regulation is moving to more efficient “market-based” ones, such 
as tradable emission permits. The economic theory predicts that emission markets reduce 
compliance costs by assigning those costs where they are lower. In contrasts to standards (that 
might not be binding after a while), market-based instruments provide constant incentives to 
innovate. The Porter Hypothesis is therefore more likely to be satisfied in industries regulated 
with the new market based instruments, especially tradable emission permits.  
 
In this line, Burtraw (2000) provides evidence that the switch of environmental regulation for 
SO2 emissions in the U.S. from technological standard with emission caps to an allowance 
trading program in 1990 reduced considerably compliance cost (40% to 140% lower than 
projection). It indeed not only enhanced innovation, but also fostered organisational change and 
competition on the upstream input market. The program was progressive, with permits from 2.5 
pounds SO2 per Btus of head input in 1995 to 1.2 in 2000 with a banking system. Firms took 
advantage of relative low-cost compliance options in early years of the program to bank 
allowances and, therefore, smoothed their abatement cost with time. It left enough flexibility to 
the firm to select the best strategy to reduce emissions. A popular one was a switch for coal with 
lower sulphur content. In the beginning phase of the new regulation, half of the reductions in 
sulphur have been achieved by switching to low-sulphur coal. It resulted in a more intense 
competition on the two markets (high and low sulphur coal), which reduced the price of inputs. 
This competition was fostered by the deregulation of railways, which reduced transportation 
costs. The industry experienced innovation in fuel blending and in the scrubber market. The 
former “command-and–control” did not provide incentives to increase SO2 removal by 
14 scrubbers from more than the 90% (for high-sulphur coal) or 70% (for low-sulphur coal) 
standard. With the new program, the incentives are such that upgrading of existing scrubbers 
through improvements is likely to occur. Lastly, the switch from technological standard to 
tradable emission allowances led to an organizational change. The responsibility for compliance 
that rested traditionally with engineers or chemists, typically in charge of environmental issues, 
has been transferred to top executives such as financial vice-presidents, who are trained to treat 
SO2 emissions allowance as financial assets. 
 
In the same vein, Hoglund Isaksson (2005) looks at the impact of a charge on nitrogen oxides 
(NOx) emissions introduced in Sweden in 1992. She examines the impact on abatement cost 
functions of 114 combustion plants during the period 1990 – 1996. Her findings suggest that 
extensive emission reductions have taken place at zero or very low cost, and that effects of 
learning and technological development in abatement have been present during the analyzed 
period.  
 
Clearly, the PH hypothesis is an important issue that will continue to draw more research.  At 
this stage, even if the PH cannot be generalized to the “whole” economy, it is clear that some 
firms, through better use of energy, or materials, have been able to reduce pollution and costs 
at the same time. Given the purpose of this paper, it is useful to try to verify the circumstances 
more likely to generate such desirable outcomes. 
 
There are many famous examples of companies which have reduced their pollution and costs at 
the same time. Let us mention a few. First, British Petroleum has been able to reduce its CO2 
emissions to 10% below their level prevailing in 1990 at no cost through an optimization of the 
production process, elimination of leakages, reuse of wastes, etc. (Reinhardt, 2001). Second, 
recently  Fortune published an article describing five changes made at the headquarters of 
Adobe systems (going from automatic faucets to motion censors), which have involved an 
“initial investment” of around $250,000 for “annual” savings of around $246,000 (Fortune, 2006). 
Third, Dow Chemicals is well known for its WRAP Award program (Waste reduction always 
pays), which was implemented in 1986. “Since the program began, Dow has given the WRAP 
Award to 395 projects. Worldwide, the projects account for the reduction of 230 000 tons of 
waste, 13 million tons of wastewater, and 8 trillion BTU’s of energy. The (net) value of all these 
projects totals roughly $1 billion
18. Fourth, when implementing ISO 14001, the authorities of 
GM’s Flint plant realized that they were using a lot of energy during week ends when the 
machines were stopped (448,918 kilowatt hours during the Thanksgiving holiday of 1999). 
Shutdown efforts were made very systematically so as to generate savings of approximately 
$250,000 per year (174 299 kwh were used during the same holiday two years later, see El 
Bizat, 2006). 
 
In the same vein, as we saw earlier, Hamschmidt and Dyllick (2006) provide a cost-benefit 
analysis of the implementation by an enterprise of ISO 14001, in which they show that 60% of 
the sampled firms reported decreases in their material and energy flows following the adoption 
of the certification.  We must also add that Lanoie has been collecting more than 50 examples, 
over the last 8 years, of companies that were able to reduce as the same time pollution as well 
as the cost of resources, energy and services (see Lanoie and Tanguay, 2000, 2004). These 
companies are very diversified in terms of size, origin, or industry. The actions taken to reach 
these win-win outcomes are also fairly diversified (reuses of waste, uses of waste as a source of 
energy, more efficient production technology, more efficient energy use, etc), which suggests 
that the set of potential opportunities is fairly wide. 
                                                 
18 http://www.dow.com/commitments/studies/wrap.htm. 
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It is not always possible to reduce at the same time pollution and the cost of energy, 
material and services, but the set of opportunities to do so seems relatively large. These 
opportunities are more likely to emerge in firms where the production process is flexible, 
in industries where the competition is fierce so that cost reductions are important, and in 
industries where market-based instruments (like pollution taxes or tradable permits) are 
implemented. 
 
vi) Cost of capital 
 
It is also possible that better environmental performance can be associated with a lower cost of 
capital. First, it is becoming quite clear that greener firms have an easier access to the capital 
markets through the proliferation of all the green (or ethical mutual funds
19). Through these 
funds, green investors can be sure that their money will be invested in firms that respect certain 
criteria like the existence of a proper Environmental Management System (EMS), or the 
absence of environmental litigation. Socially responsible investment (SRI) is becoming an 
important phenomenon. Assets in U.S. socially screened funds have increased by 258% 
between 1995 and 2005, a rate of growth faster than the average of other professionally 
managed U.S. funds. In France, the increase was of 92 % between 2002 and 2006. In 2005, 
nearly one out of every ten dollars (9.4%) under professional management in the United States 
is involved in socially responsible investing (10 to 15 % in Europe)
20. Portfolio analyses allows 
one to compare the performance of these socially screened funds with that of conventional 
funds.   
 
Second, firms with better environmental performance can borrow more easily from banks. Most 
banks now have a team of experts to evaluate the environmental performance of possible 
borrowers, in particular the size of potential liabilities due to contaminated assets
21. 
Furthermore, around 40 international banks have now adopted the “Equator Principles” to make 
sure that the projects they finance are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and 
reflect sound environmental management practices
22. Montel and Debailleul (2004) argue that 
the quality of the environmental management of a firm may serve as a proxy its level of risk: i) it 
contributes to its profitability; ii) it is an indicator of the overall quality of the management; iii) it 
reflects the legal or regulatory risk, and iv) it is a proxy for market opportunities. Both banks and 
insurers may use this information. 
 
Third, shareholders in general may be influenced by information on the environmental 
performance of companies, and their reactions can be perceptible on the stock market. These 
movements may, in turn, influence the cost of capital. A large number of empirical studies have 
tried to identify the stock market reaction to news on environmental performance
23. Three main 
                                                 
19 In general, the environmental performance is one of the criteria used to select firms in an ethical mutual 
fund. 
20  http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sri_trends_report_2005.pdf. and La Tribune March 
1
st 2007. 
21 For instance, the French bank BNP Paribas has a team of 120 professionals in the area of sustainable 
development http://www.bnpparibas.com/fr/developpement-durable Similarly, the American Citibank was 
reporting that, in 2004 and 2005, more than 1500 of their employees were trained on environmental 
issues. http://www.citi.com/citigroup/citizen/community/data/citizen05_en.pdf. 
22 See www.equator-principles.com.  One can also refer to the Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) in 
which members agree to use part of their budget to reward  brokers that publish research on extra-
financial issues such as climate change or brand management, see http://www.enhancedanalytics.com/ 
23 For a shorter survey, see also Wagner et al. (2001). 
16 approaches are dominant in that literature: a) portfolio analyses; b) event studies; and c) long-
term studies using regression analysis. In each case, we will present the methodology used, the 





Portfolio analysis is used to examine whether SRI funds (or indices) exhibit a different 
performance from funds in a more general investment context. Such analyses compare the 
economic performance of portfolios consisting of companies with a higher environmental or 
social performance with portfolios of companies that have not been screened with these criteria. 
The comparison is done using indicators like Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe and Treynor ratios
25. In 
general, it is expected that ethical funds will under-perform over the long run because funds 
managers are constrained to a subset of the market portfolio. 
 
We came across 16 studies of that type.  Table 3 presents the main characteristics of these 
studies.  Eleven of them come to the conclusion that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of SRI funds and conventional ones, while five of them 




PERFORMANCE MEASURE AND DATA  STUDY  DATA SET 




Returns of 15 ethical 
unit trusts from UK. 
Ethical funds: Those 
which exclude one or 
more company groups 
from their portfolio for 
non-financial reasons 




Weak evidence that 
ethical funds tend to 
out-perform general 
market indices. Bias 
towards smaller 





17 US Socially 
responsible funds. 
US SRI (Socially 













Returns of 15 ethical 
unit trusts from UK. 
Ethical funds: Those 
which exclude one or 
more company groups 
from their portfolio for 
non-financial reasons 
(identified by the EIRIS).
Mean monthly 
returns, with unit 




Confirm the small cap 
bias (Luhter et al. 92) 
and show that 
comparing ethical 




                                                 
24 See also the discussion in Rennings et al (2006) and Plinke and Knorzer (2006). 
25 For more details, see Bauer et al. (2005). 






29 ethical trusts and 
29 non-ethical trusts 
in the U.K. between 
1986 and 1993. 
Ethical funds: Those 
which exclude one or 
more company groups 
from their portfolio for 
non-financial reasons 
(identified by the EIRIS).
Jensen’s  measure.  The mean excess 
returns of ethical 
trusts appeared to 
under perform both 
non-ethical trusts and 
the market in general. 
However, on a risk 





97 firms publicly 
listed on NYSE(1), 
1989–92 (inclusive). 
Three-element scale 




market return data 
from CRSP (4) 












159 firms rated on 
eleven social criteria 
by the CEP. Portfolio 
pairs were designed 
to contrast firms 
rated favorably on 
one or more social 
criteria against firms 
that rated poorly on 
the same criteria. 
Eleven social criteria 
defined by the CEP. 











of 1,300 equity 
stocks and a socially 
screened universe of 
approximately 950 
stocks. 
The screens address 
the following social 
investing issues: 
military; nuclear power; 
product (alcohol, 
tobacco, and gambling); 
and environment. 
Average monthly 






the average monthly 
returns of the 
screened and 
unscreened universes 




400 firms from the 
Domini Social Index 
(DSI), from 1986 to 
1994. 
The DSI excludes firms 
engaged in the 
manufacture of alcohol 
or tobacco, gambling, 
military weapons, 
nuclear power, and 
business tied to South 
Africa. Firms were also 
evaluated on their 














Performance of the 
Domini Social Equity 
Mutual Fund 
compares favorably to 
the performance of the 
Vanguard S&P 500 
Index and Vanguard 
Extended Market 
Index Mutua. 







60 European funds 
from four countries. 
Ethical funds: Those 
which exclude one or 
more company groups 
from their portfolio for 
non-financial reasons 
(identified by the EIRIS).
Mean monthly 
returns. 
There is no difference 
between ethical and 
non-ethical funds 
according to the 
performance 
measures employed. 
Neither type of fund 
displayed any ability to 
time the market. 
Edwards 
1998 
A total of 51 
environmental 
leaders in eight 
industry sectors 
(defined by Financial 
Times All Share 
listing); each of 
these was matched 
to 3–5 UK firms, for 
1992–93, listed on 
the London Stock 
Exchange. 
In-depth positive 
assessment of various 
aspects of each firm’s 
environmental 
performance and 
management based on 
products and services; 
environmental 
disclosure by the firm, 









on equity) from 
1996 REFS (6). 




performing firms and 
other firms, the latter 
perform worse, though 












From 1981 to 1997 
(partial). 
Portfolio selection 
strategy in which the 
portfolio manager 
specifically includes 
firms in his/her portfolio 
that conduct some 
positively regarded 
social policy and/or firms 
that have recently 
abandoned a policy that 
had some negatively 
regarded social 
component. 
Jensen’s Alpha, the 
Sharpe Ratio, and 
the Treynor Ratio. 




the sample that did 




Firms from the 
Domini Social Index 
and the S&P500 
(Standard & Poor). 
From 1990 to 1998. 






of Returns, Alpha 
of the DSI with 
Other Indexes as 
Benchmarks. 
The Domini Social 
Index, a socially 
responsible version of 
the S&P 500, 
performed better than 
the S&P 500. The raw 
returns of the DSI 
were higher than 
those of the S&P 500 
during the 1990–98 
period and so were 
their risk-adjusted 
returns. 







30 ethical funds and 
a sample of 30 "non-
ethical" funds, from 
1995 to 2001. 
Ethical funds: Those 
which exclude one or 
more company groups 
from their portfolio for 
non-financial reasons 
(identified by the EIRIS).
The average 
weekly return, the 
standard deviation 
of these returns, 
Jensen’s Alpha, the 
Sharpe Ratio, and 
the Treynor Ratio. 
There is not a 
significant difference 
between ethical and 





16 German and 
Swiss funds, and 30 





indices. From 2000 
to 2002. 
Explanation of the 
ethical approach of each 
fund. 
Jensen´s alpha.  Socially  screened 






SRI funds and indices 
have a relatively high 






mutual funds with 
domestic equity 
orientation only. 
From 1994 to 2003. 










ethical mutual funds 
and their conventional 
peers. On average, no 
evidence that the 
investment style of 
ethical mutual funds 
differs significantly 





103 German, UK 
and US ethical 
mutual funds and 
4384 conventional 
mutual funds,. From 
1990 to 2001. 
Criteria (ethical screens) 
from Morningstar (US), 
EIRIS (UK) and 
Ecoreporter (Germany). 
Jensen's alpha,   
multifactor 
analysis. 
No evidence of a 
statistically significant 
difference in return 
between ethical and 
conventional mutual 
fund returns. Ethical 
mutual funds exhibit 
distinct investment 
styles and they tend to 
be more growth-
oriented. 
1 New York Stock Exchange. 
2 Ethical Investment Research Services. 
3 Council on Economic Priorities (USA). 
4 Center for Research in Security Prices. 
5 Greenhouse gas and ozone-depleting substances. 
6 Really Essential Financial Statistics. 
 
As a general conclusion, it is fair to say that the performance of SRI funds is comparable to that 
of conventional funds, and not worse as predicted by theory. However, the weaknesses of these 
20 studies should be noted. First, the financial success of existing funds depends heavily on the 
ability of fund management. Portfolio studies cannot easily separate these management effects 
from social or environmental performance effects. Second, in these analyses, only the average 
performances of funds are compared. Consequently, the specific form of the influence of 
environmental performance on the economic performance can hardly be separated from other 
influences like management of the fund, capitalisation, or regional peculiarities. The 
identification of specific effects requires econometric methods that include all control variables 
besides the variable of interest (environmental performance). Bauer et al. 2004, 2005 overcome 
partly this difficulty through the use of the Carhart’s (1997) multifactor performance attribution 
approach. They also conclude that “any performance differential between ethical mutual funds 
and their conventional peers is insignificant”. 
 
b) Event Studies 
 
The event-study methodology is based on the assumption that the capital market is sufficiently 
efficient to reflect the impact of all new information (event) on the future expected profits of firms 
(see Fama et al., 1969). The reaction to the announcement of an event is obtained by predicting 
a “normal” return for each firm during an “event window” (usually the day prior to the event, the 
day of the event and a few days after the event), and then subtracting this predicted normal 
return from the actual return observed on those days of the event window. If there is a 
significant difference between the predicted return and the observed return (i.e., an abnormal 
return), one can conclude that the event had a significant influence on the stock price. Normal 
returns are usually predicted using a version of the Capital asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
 
Many researchers have examined the effects of environmental “events” on stock market 
performance. The events considered have generally the character of negative news, such as 
information about illegal spills, prosecutions, fines, or the emission data related to the American 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Only a few studies consider the effects of positive news, such 
as information about companies winning environmental awards (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; 
Yamashita et al., 1999). Some authors, like Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Jones et al. (1994) 
and White (1996), have considered only one major event (the Bhopal explosion, the Exxon 
Valdez Oil spill).  We surveyed 14 event studies.  Table 4 presents the main characteristics and 
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reaction to lawsuit, 
measured by the 




1.2 percent loss in 
market value (on 
average) at the filing 
of the lawsuit. No 
significant abnormal 
return at the 
settlement. 










similar to Union 
Carbide’s. Five-
day window 
from Dec. 3, 
1984 (trading 
day 0) to Dec. 7, 
1984. 
Union Carbide’s 
chemical leak in Bhopal, 






occurred. Firms with 
more extensive 
environmental 
disclosures in their 
financial report prior to 
the chemical leak 














The stock value 
declined on the day of 
the announcement of 
suit settlements 
resulting in fines 
(-2%). 
Jones et al., 
1994 
The stock of 
Exxon after the 
Valdez Spill. 
Announcement of the 
Exxon Valdez oil-spill 
accident. 
Abnormal  Returns.  The stock of Exxon 
suffered a sustained 
drop over 6 months 
with a value loss 
ranging from 4.7$ 




under 1989 TRI 
(2) regulations; 
disclosure 
based on 1987 
data (n = 463). 
TRI emissions for 1987.  Abnormal Returns.  Significant  negative 
returns on the day TRI 





162 Firms in 
manufacturing, 




Environmental awards in 
NEXIS database; 
negative news: chemical 




(CRSP, NYSE and 
AMEX) data. 
Significant positive or 
negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for 
the (–1, +1) event 
window of 0.63% and 
–0.82%, respectively. 




Signing up to the 






excess returns of 
+1.05% for 
signatories. 
White  1996b  Firms  from  the 
oil industry, 
March 1988 to 
September 1989 
(n = 1 to 10). 
Announcement of the 
Exxon Valdez oil-spill 
accident. 
Average abnormal 




returns for Exxon 







22, 1985 - 
October 20, 
1986. 
Event study leading to 





exhibited an overall 
negative reaction to 
announcements of 
specific legislative 
actions leading to 
SARA. 








appeared on the 




1990 to 1992. 
List of the polluting firms 
from Ministry of the 




Abnormal loss at the 
second appearance 
on the list, and if a firm 
has more than one 
plant appearing on the 
list. 
Khanna et al. 
1998 
91 publicly 
traded firms in 
the chemical 
industry, listed in 
the TRI. From 
1989 to 1994. 
TRI requires facilities to 
report the quantities of 
on-site toxic releases to 
air, water, land, and 
underground injection 
and the quantities of off-




Firms known to be 
polluters: a one-time 
provision of 
environmental 






















scores published in 
Fortune magazine 
(Fortune, July, 1993). 
Daily abnormal 
market returns and 
long term study. 
Short term: 
environmental 
performance does not 
appear to be a very 
important issue to 
stock investors. Long 










under 1989 TRI 
regulations; 
disclosure 
based on 1987 
data (n = 463). 
TRI emissions for 1987.  Abnormal Returns.  The  aggregate 
average TRI impact 
on stock price is no 
longer significant. 
However, there is a 
significant market 
reaction to the news 
for each individual firm




48 firms from 4 
developing 
countries. From 
1990 to 1994. 
Environmental news 
collected from important 
newspapers. 
Daily abnormal 
market returns.  
Capital markets from 
developing countries 
appear to react to the 
announcement of 
specific positive and 
negative 
environmental events.
1 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
23 2 Toxic Release Inventory. 
3 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. 
 
Event studies offer strong econometric results of causality when they are limited to one or at 
most five trading days after the event to ensure that confounding news do not interfere with the 
effect of interest. In general, these studies show that financial markets respond significantly in 
the short run to environmental news. For example, in the five trading days following the 1986 
explosion at Union Carbide‘s plant at Bhopal in India, the market value of that company fell by 
approximately $1 billion or 27.9% (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994).  
 
Can we conclude from such results that bad environmental performance is leading to an 
increase in the cost of capital? The potential reaction of capital markets to new information on 
companies’ environmental impact can actually be explained by two basic scenarios
26. In the first 
one, new information on liabilities (potential litigation or fine) or clean-up costs enters the market 
at time t  causing the stock price to drop because investors expect reduced earnings and 
dividend payments. The return is unchanged if the fundamentals of the company do not change. 
This is the cash flow news effect best tested using the event study methodology.  
 
Such a short-run negative price movement does not, however, mean that the price of capital is 
going up. Short-term price changes do not provide enough substance to formulate buy/sell 
strategies unless we believe that the environmental performance to be a matter for day traders 
constantly arbitraging. We can thus turn to the second scenario, the “green investor effect”
27 
that may come through the so-called green mutual funds mentioned above. Finding out about 
bad environmental news, these investors may worry about the quality of the management of the 
companies involved and decide to sell “dirty” stocks, which reduces their price. Investors’green 
preferences are likely to be more long-lived, and thus require multi-period analyses to be well 
investigated (using panel data and regression analysis for instance). In this second scenario, as 
the price of “dirty” stocks falls, investors will demand compensation with a higher return and, 
therefore, the cost of capital for such companies will increase, and it will be more difficult to 
raise new funds. In the context of our discussion on the impact of better environmental 
performance on the cost of capital, it will be central to find out which of these two scenarios 
dominates. 
 
Other limitations of the event-study methodology have been recognized in the literature. For 
instance, Cram and Koehler (2000) have criticized the studies on TRI on the ground that they 
failed to account for contemporaneous correlations across sample companies, which arise when 
all of them experience the same event (TRI release) on the same day. Re-analysing Hamilton’s 
(1995) results, Cram and Koehler used Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SURE) and found that the aggregate average TRI impact on stock prices is no longer 
significant (although, there is a significant market reaction to the news for each individual firm on 
the event day). Along the same lines, many authors (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel ,1997, and 
McWilliams et al., 1999) have noted various methodological concerns with event studies. They 
criticize the use of the CAPM model, which is often chosen to predict normal returns. They also 
                                                 
26 This part of the presentation is largely influenced by Koehler (2006). 
27 Heinkel et al. (2001) demonstrate that the number of green investors is key to affecting stock prices as 
in the second scenario. They design an equilibrium model of capital markets assumed to be efficient with 
two types of risk-averse investors: neutral investors with low sensitivity to environmental concerns and 
green investors. These investors are faced with opportunities to buy more or less “dirty” stocks. After 
conducting sensitivity analysis on various parameters, they find that a key determinant of the 
environmental performance of companies is the fraction of green investors. They conclude that it is 
necessary to have at least 25% green investors to change corporate environmental investment strategy. 
24 question the assumption of investors’ rational expectations, arguing that investors could be 
biased. 
 
c) Long-Term Studies using Regression Analysis 
 
In these studies, investigators examine, through regression analysis, the relationship between 
certain characteristics of companies (including their environmental performance), and their 
economic performance. In contrast to event studies, the analysis concentrates on 
characteristics of companies and not on specific news about the companies. In contrast to 
portfolio analysis, researchers do not examine a portfolio of stocks, but single stocks.  We 
identified 12 studies in this category, which are summarized in Table 5.  Different measures of 
economic performance (Tobin’s Q
28, return on assets, return on sales, return on equity) and 
environmental performances (TRI emissions, ISO 14001 certification, the adoption of other 
international environmental standards) are used in the various studies.   
 
TABLE 5 
Long term studies 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE AND DATA  STUDY  DATA SET 
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performance is found 
to be significantly 
negative related to 
one-year and five-year 
earnings-per share 
growth forecasts 
(based on industry 
adjusted values). 
                                                 
28 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm divided by its replacement cost. 
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Wagner at al., 
2002; 
37 firms from 
the European 
paper industry. 
Index based on SO2, 
NOX and COD 
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No impact with the 
other measures. 
Hibiki et al., 
2003 
573 publicly-
held firms in the 
manufacturing 
industry in the 
first section of 
the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange on 
March 31, 2002. 
Adoption of the 
ISO14001certification. 
Tobin's  q.  Introduction of the 
ISO14001 certification
system contributes to 
a statistically 
significant increase in 
the market value of 
the firms in the 
manufacturing 
industry by 11% to 
14%. 
1 Investor Responsibility Research Center 
 
Nine studies show that better environmental performance is associated with better economic 
performance.  Two studies show no impact, while one concludes on a negative relationship. 
Generally speaking, one can say that these results suggest that a bad environmental 
performance is associated with a lower economic performance on a long-term basis, which 
implies an increase in the cost of capital.  
 
A difficulty with these studies is to determine the sense of the causality. A first plausible 
mechanism is that environmental performance leads to changes in financial performance, as 
postulated in the studies discussed above. Second, the sense of the causality may be reversed, 
where profitable enterprises can afford to invest in environmental performance. Third, there may 
be another omitted factor, influencing both environmental and economic performances, that is 
responsible for the apparent statistical relationship. 
 
Apart from Wagner et al. 2002, very few attempts have been made to tackle the question with 
simultaneous equation models. Their results are mitigated: i) with two out of three measures of 
economic performance that they use (ROE, ROS), there is no significant relationship between 
environmental and economic performance; ii) with the other one ROCE
29, they find a negative 
relationship.  More of that work is needed in the future. 
 
Furthermore, some researchers have addressed the concern that omitted variables influencing 
both phenomena may be at play. They have noted that gains in companies financial 
                                                 
29 ROCE: return on capital employed. 
27 performance associated with environmental performance may be coincidental (interact) with the 
adoption of the latest technology (Dowell et al., 2000), an environmental management system 
(Schaltegger and Synnestvedt, 2002), or an increase in R&D expenditures (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000). 
 
Another possible criticism is the common use of the TRI as an indicator of the environmental 
performance. In particular, TRI does not provide any information about emissions from non-toxic 
substances (like carbon dioxide emissions), or through energy or material use. Finally, in the 
perspective of sustainable development, through which one is concerned with the triple bottom 
line, environmental, social and economic, it would be useful to also look at the influence of 
social performance on economic performance
30. 
 
Overall, what can we conclude from this extensive literature regarding the impact a better 
environmental performance on the cost of capital? It seems clear that a large majority of the 
portfolio analyses, event studies and long-term studies show that a better environmental 
performance is associated with a better financial performance (or, at least not worse). As we 
discussed, the long-term studies are the most reliable and, in spite of their weaknesses, they 
offer converging evidences to support that a lower environmental performance is leading to a 
lower financial performance, and thus to a higher cost of capital.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that in, day-to-day life, banks (and insurers) examine the environmental 
performance of their clients and adjust lending conditions according to that performance. It is 
also evident that green or ethical mutual funds are getting more popular, which is providing 
green firms with a better access to capital. Thus, we can conclude that there is strong 
evidence that a better environmental performance does not lead to an increase in the 
cost of capital; there is some relatively convincing evidence that a better environmental 
performance leads to reduction in the cost of capital. Large firms with shares exchanged 
on the stock markets are more likely to benefit from these gains. 
 
vII) Cost of labour 
 
Some authors also argue that a better environmental performance can lead to a reduction in the 
cost of labour. As stated by two managers of Ciba Geigy: “An improved image of the company 
results in an improved atmosphere in the workplace and hence in higher productivity…People 
who feel proud of the company for which they work not only perform better on the job, but also 
become ambassadors for the company with their friends and relatives, enhancing good will and 
leading to a virtuous circle of good repute. Of course, this is impossible to quantify, but it seems 
clear that it is true…This is especially important in recruiting talented young scientists, 
managers, and engineers, many of whom…simply would not work for a company with a poor 
social and environmental reputation…No one wants to work for a dodgy company, and the 
brightest people obviously have a choice” (Reinhardt, 1999, p. 11). Similarly, De Backer (1999) 
provides anecdotal evidence that ISO14001 has significant effects on the employees’ morale 
and productivity much more than the ISO 9000 certification. 
 
If this is the case, a better environmental performance can indeed reduce the cost of labour by 
reducing the cost of illnesses, absenteeism, recruitment and turnover. A few analysts, like 
Lankoski (2006), have put forward this argument in favour of labour cost reduction. However, 
even if the argument is fairly compelling, to our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence 
supporting it. In order to provide empirical evidences of labour cost reductions associated with 
                                                 
30 For an example of such a study, see Rennings et al. (2006). 
28 less pollution, one would need a data base including observations on proxies of labour cost, like 
turnover rates and absenteeism, and data on environmental performance. We are not aware of 
a database including all these elements, a new survey would have to be designed to test this 
hypothesis.  Such an exercise would certainly be helpful. 
 
However, indirect evidence exists from surveys indicating that employees and unions constitute 
an important source of pressure on firms to reduce pollution. For instance, Henriques et al. 
(2007) find that workers’ pressure is a significant determinant of a firm’s commitment toward a 
better environment (e.g., the implementation of an EMS). Grolleau et al. (2006) show that 
improving human resource management is a significant motivation for the decision to obtain the 
ISO-14000 certification.  
  
What types of companies could eventually reach labour costs reductions associated with 
a better environmental performance? Basic intuition suggests the following: 
i) companies whose emissions can affect the health of their workers; ii) companies that 
seek to attract young well educated workers, like scientists and engineers, and 
iii)  companies located in areas where sensitivity to environmental concerns is more 




The conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes as an additional 
burden for companies imposed by the government. However, during the last decade, this 
paradigm has been challenged by a number of analysts who suggest different ways through 
which improving the environmental performance of a company can be associated with better 
economic performance. To be systematic, it is important to look at both sides of the balance 
sheet. 
 
First, a better environmental performance can lead to an increase in revenues through the 
following channels: i)  a better access to certain markets; ii)  the possibility to differentiate 
products and iii)  the possibility to sell pollution-control technology. Second, a better 
environmental performance can lead to cost reductions in the following categories: iv) regulatory 
cost; v)  cost of material, energy and services (this refers mainly to the Porter hypothesis); 
vi) cost of capital, and vii) cost of labour. For each of these seven possibilities, we presented the 
mechanisms involved, a systematic view of the empirical evidence available, and a discussion 
of the gaps in the empirical literature.   
 
The objective of the paper was not to show that a reduction of pollution is always accompanied 
by a better financial performance, it was rather to show that the expenses incurred to reduce 
pollution can be partly or completely compensated by gains made elsewhere. Through a 
systematic examination of all the possibilities, we also wanted to identify the circumstances 
most likely to lead to a “win-win” situation, i.e., better environmental and financial performance. 
These circumstances are summarized in Table 6. 
 
29 TABLE 6 
POSITIVE LINKS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE – A SUMMARY 
Possibilities to Increase Revenues 
Circumstances Making this Possibility More 
Likely 
i)  Better  Access  to  Certain  Markets  More likely for firms selling to the public sector: 
(construction, energy services, transport 
equipments, medical products, and office 
equipments). 
ii)  Possibility to Differentiate Products  More likely when: 
a)  credible information about the environmental 
features of the product; 
b) willingness-to-pay  by the consumers; 
c)  barrier to imitation. Wide range of possibilities. 
iii)  Selling Pollution-Control Technologies  More likely when firms already have R&D facilities. 
Possibilities to Reduce Costs   
iv) Regulatory  Cost  –  More likely in industries that are highly 
regulated like chemical, pulp and paper, 
metallurgy, etc.  
v)  Cost of Materials, Energy and Services  –  More likely when 
a) firms have a flexible production process;  
b) firms are in highly competitive industries where 
optimization of resources is important; 
c) firms are in industries where market-based 
environmental policies are implemented 
vi)  Cost of Capital  –  More likely for firms with shares exchanged in 
stock markets. 
vii)  Cost of Labour  –  More likely for: 
a)  firms whose emissions may affect the health of 
their workers; 
b)  firms that seek to attract young well-educated 
workers; 
c) firms located in areas where sensitivity to 
environmental concerns is important. 
 
This table allows us to have in mind a taxonomy of the firms who are more likely to benefit from 
a better environmental performance.  For instance, an energy company located on the West 
Coast of the U.S., and selling a part of its production to public authorities, is very likely to make 
a financial gain from an improvement in its environmental performance.  However, farms which, 
in general, are less scrutinized by regulators, are not on the stock market and have few 
30 employees are less likely to benefit from a better environmental performance (Lanoie and 
Llerena, 2007).   
 
It is interesting to try to “forecast” how robust our arguments will be in the next future. On one 
hand, even if there is a wide range of possibilities, one must recognize that there are probably 
diminishing returns
31. Concerning cost-reducing opportunities, it is likely that there are some 
obvious “low-hanging” fruits, but that more efforts are required after these fruits have been 
harvested. Similarly, the sales-enhancing potential of environment performance improvements 
is probably limited by the willingness-to-pay of consumers for environment-friendly products. On 
the other hand, many of the trends we described in this paper are likely to become more and 
more important in the future like green consumerism, social investing or employees looking to 
be hired by green companies. 
 
Other temporal aspects are worth discussing. It is common for investments in environmental 
performance that, while many costs occur in the short term (e.g., green buildings, extra cost for 
the purchase of a hybrid car, etc), the associated benefits are uncertain and may arise only in 
the longer term. Due to this temporal asymmetry in the distribution of costs and revenues, the 
period over which the economic impact is examined has an important effect on the outcome of 
the examination. In most cases, the smaller is the discount rate, the longer is the time-period 
considered, the more win-win situations there are. Managers focusing on short-term returns for 




Lastly, from a sustainable development perspective, which is oriented toward a triple bottom line 
(economic, environmental, social), it would also be interesting to examine the social 
performance of firms and its relation with economic performance
33. We have deliberately tried to 
avoid to mix environmental and social performance, although in certain areas, like ethical 
mutual funds, it is almost impossible. This is a difficult topic since there is no clear consensus on 
the measures of social performance but, given the importance of sustainable development in 

















                                                 
31 See also Wagner et al. (2001) 
32 This discussion draws on Lankoski (2006). Ambec and Barla (2006) show that (time-inconsistent) 
present-biased managers tend to postpone the investments needed to harvest those “low-hanging fruits”.    
33 See in particular, Margolis and Walsh (2001) and UNEP (2001). 
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